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This paper explores the impact of offshoring, or contracting out of business activities to foreign 
providers, on firm productivity, using Japanese firm-level data for the period 1994-2000. We find that 
offshoring has generally a positive effect on productivity growth. This effect is robust to controlling for 
the possible endogeneity of offshoring with respect to unobserved productivity shocks. Our preferred 
specification suggests that a one percent increase in offshoring intensity raises productivity growth by 
0.17 percent. For the average offshoring firm this implies a 1.8 percent increase in annual productivity 
growth. These results do not appear to depend much on either the level of technological sophistication of 
a firms’ industry or a firms’ international orientation. However, we find that the scope for productivity 
improvements from offshoring depends negatively on the initial level of productivity of the firm.   
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The rise in offshoring, or contracting out of business activities to foreign providers, has been an important 
factor behind the growth in world trade. East Asia is not an exception to the rise in offshoring: The growing 
geographical specialization along the value-chain has given rise to the development of sophisticated 
production sharing arrangements within East Asia. In particular, Japanese firms have increasingly taken 
advantage of the business opportunities provided through offshoring of production activities to other East 
Asian countries.  
 
Given the importance of these developments, understanding implications of offshoring should be of 
significant interest to academics and the policy-making community. However, most research so far has 
concentrated on the potentially adverse labor market aspects of offshoring in developed countries, and 
much less attention has been directed towards understanding the benefits of the offshoring phenomenon. 
Possible benefits of offshoring include increased firm profitability, reduced consumer prices and enhanced 
total factor productivity. In the present paper we focus on the impact of offshoring on total factor 
productivity. Offshoring may lead to the improvement of the productivity of primary factors of domestic 
production by allowing firms to specialize in activities they perform relatively well. We focus explicitly on 
goods offshoring rather than services offshoring which has recently become the centre of the offshoring 
debate, but does not come close, as of yet, to the importance of goods offshoring,  
    
For our analysis of the impact of offshoring on productivity growth we make use of firm-level data for the 
Japanese manufacturing sector for the period 1994-2000. One great advantage of our dataset is that it 
comprises information on the value of subcontracting to foreign providers so that we can construct a direct 
measure of offshoring. This measure includes both subcontracting at arm’s length, which corresponds to 
‘international outsourcing’, and the purchases of intermediate inputs from a firm’s foreign affiliates. We 
refer to this broad notion of offshoring as ‘offshoring’. In addition, we have data on the amount of 
purchases from a firm’s foreign subsidiaries, which provides us with a proxy for the extent of international 
subcontracting within the firm. We refer to this second measure as ‘international insourcing’. By including 
both measures simultaneously we can infer to what extent the organisational model of offshoring, intra-
firm or arm’s length, matter. Finally, we also consider the effects of subcontracting to domestic providers, 
which we refer to as ‘domestic sourcing’.  
 
We find that offshoring and international insourcing have generally a positive effect on total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth at the firm level. This effect is robust to controlling for the possible endogeneity 
of offshoring and international insourcing with respect to unobserved productivity shocks. The results 
suggest that a one percent increase in offshoring intensity raises productivity growth by 0.17 percent. For 
the average offshoring firm this implies, ceteris paribus, an annual TFP growth rate that is 1.8 percent 
higher than that of non-offshoring firms. The positive effect appears to be associated with both 
international insourcing and international outsourcing. These results are further fairly general in the sense 
that the positive relationship between offshoring and productivity growth extends across firms with 
different levels of technological sophistication or international orientation. However, we find that the scope 
for productivity improvements from offshoring depends negatively on the initial level of productivity of the 
firm, which indicates that offshoring may be an effective channel in restoring the competitiveness of less 
productive firms. 
 1.  Introduction  
The rise in offshoring, or contracting out of business activities to foreign providers, has 
been an important factor behind the growth in world trade (Yeats, 1998; Yi, 2003). East 
Asia is not an exception to the rise in offshoring: The growing geographical specialization 
along the value-chain has given rise to the development of sophisticated production sharing 
arrangements within East Asia (Ng and Yeats, 1999; Fukao, Ishido and Ito, 2003). In 
particular, Japanese firms have increasingly taken advantage of the business opportunities 
provided through offshoring of production activities to other East Asian countries (Kimura 
and Ando, 2005).   
  Given the importance of these developments, understanding implications of 
offshoring should be of significant interest to academics and the policy-making community. 
However, most research so far has concentrated on the potentially adverse labor market 
aspects of offshoring in developed countries (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999; Head and 
Ries, 2002; Hijzen, Görg and Hine, 2005), and much less attention has been directed 
towards understanding the benefits of the offshoring phenomenon. Possible benefits of 
offshoring include increased firm profitability, reduced consumer prices and enhanced total 
factor productivity. In the present paper we focus on the impact of offshoring on total factor 
productivity. Offshoring may lead to the improvement of the productivity of primary factors 
of domestic production by allowing firms to specialize in activities they perform relatively 
well.
1 We focus explicitly on goods offshoring rather than services offshoring which has 
recently become the centre of the offshoring debate, but does not come close, as of yet, to 
the importance of goods offshoring (Amiti and Wei, 2006).     
    
                                                        
1 Offshoring may also yield important benefits to the economy due to sizeable cost-savings that may translate 
in either higher firm profits and/or lower consumer prices. However, this aspect of offshoring cannot be 
examined in the analytical framework of the present paper, as we will later explain.   
 1  For our analysis of the impact of offshoring on productivity growth we make use of 
firm-level data for the Japanese manufacturing sector for the period 1994-2000. One great 
advantage of our dataset is that it comprises information on the value of subcontracting to 
foreign providers so that we can construct a direct measure of offshoring. This measure 
includes both subcontracting at arm’s length, which corresponds to ‘international 
outsourcing’, and the purchases of intermediate inputs from a firm’s foreign affiliates. We 
refer to this broad notion of offshoring as ‘offshoring’. In addition, we have data on the 
amount of purchases from a firm’s foreign subsidiaries, which provides us with a proxy for 
the extent of international subcontracting within the firm. Following Olsen (2006) we refer 
to this second measure as ‘international insourcing’. By including both measures 
simultaneously we can infer to what extent the organisational model of offshoring, 
intra-firm or arm’s length, matter. Finally, we also consider the effects of subcontracting to 
domestic providers, which we refer to as ‘domestic sourcing’.   
  A number of previous studies have analyzed similar issues using industry-level data. 
For the measurement of offshoring, such studies typically rely on input-output data. Egger 
and Egger (2006) analyze how international outsourcing affects the productivity of 
low-skilled workers employed in the EU manufacturing sector. They find that the rise in 
international outsourcing accounted for 6 percent of the increase in value added per worker 
during the period 1992-1997. Amiti and Wei (2006) analyze the productivity effects of 
materials and services offshoring on the productivity of US firms. They find that both 
materials and services offshoring have a positive effect on firm productivity, but that the 
positive effect of services offshoring is considerably larger, accounting for about 11 percent 
of productivity growth during the sample period compared to 5 percent for materials 
offshoring.  
  Görg and Hanley (2005) and Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2005) were the first to analyze 
the impact of offshoring on productivity using firm-level data. The main advantage of using 
 2firm-level data is, no doubt, that it allows one to control for firm heterogeneity. Using data 
for Ireland, they find that both materials and services offshoring benefit firm productivity, 
but that the benefits only accrue to multinationals and exporters. Criscuolo and Leaver 
(2005) who focus exclusively on services offshoring also find a positive impact on 
productivity, using data for the United Kingdom.
2  
  To the best of our knowledge, the link between offshoring and productivity has not 
been explicitly explored in the context of Japan. Kimura (2002) analyzes the relationship 
between subcontracting and productivity, but does not consider international subcontracting. 
Tomiura (2005) analyzes the determinants of offshoring decisions. He finds that firms that 
engage in offshoring tend to be larger and more productive than firms that do not offshore, 
suggesting that there may be sizable fixed costs associated with offshoring.   
  To preview our results, we find that offshoring and international insourcing have 
generally a positive effect on total factor productivity (TFP) growth at the firm level. This 
effect is robust to controlling for the possible endogeneity of offshoring and international 
insourcing with respect to unobserved productivity shocks by employing the system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The results suggest that a one percent increase in offshoring intensity raises 
productivity growth by 0.17 percent. For the average offshoring firm this implies, ceteris 
paribus, an annual TFP growth rate that is 1.8 percent higher than that of non-offshoring 
firms. The positive effect appears to be associated with both international insourcing and 
international outsourcing. These results are further fairly general in the sense that the 
positive relationship between offshoring and productivity growth extends across firms with 
different levels of technological sophistication or international orientation. However, we 
find that the scope for productivity improvements from offshoring depends negatively on 
                                                        
2 See Olsen (2006) for an excellent survey on the productivity impact of offshoring.   
 3the initial level of productivity of the firm, which indicates that offshoring may be an 
effective channel in restoring the competitiveness of less productive firms.     
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
methodology, whereas Section 3 describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics 
on offshoring. In Section 4, we discuss the estimation results, and finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  Empirical  Methodology  
In line with recent production function studies such as Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, 
and Prantl (2004), we adopt a two-step estimation procedure in which we first derive a TFP 
measure and then estimate the effect of offshoring on the growth of the TFP measure. 
Compared to a one-step procedure in which we would directly estimate the impact of 
offshoring on value added growth, the two-step procedure has the advantage that we do not 
need to use the growth of the capital stock or labor as regressors. Since the capital stock and 
labor are often highly persistent, the first-differenced log of capital stock and labor may be 
close to a white noise. Consequently, the estimated coefficients on ∆lnK and ∆lnL from 
regression of ∆lnY are often very different from commonly accepted values, 1/3 and 2/3, 
respectively. 
2.1  Measures of total factor productivity 
In order to analyze the impact of offshoring on firm-level total factor productivity growth, 
we start off by defining two measures of total factor productivity (TFP). First, we employ 
the chained multilateral index of firm-level TFP based on the methodology in Caves, 
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where subscripts i and t represent firm i and year t, respectively. Y refers to value added, K 
to capital, L to labor, and siJt is the cost share of factor J for firm i in year t.  ln t Y ,  ln t J , and 
Jt s   are the arithmetic means of  ,  ln it Y ln it J , and  iJt s , respectively, across all i in the same 
2-digit industry in year t. Equation (1) implies that the multilateral TFP index, 
IN
it TFP , 
measures firm i's TFP level in year t relative to the TFP level of the hypothetical firm in 
year 0 whose input shares are equal to the arithmetic mean of input shares and whose output 
and input quantities are equal to the geometric mean of output and input quantities, 
respectively.    
  Second, we derive a regression-based measure of firm-level TFP by estimating: 
   (2)  ˆˆ ln ln ln ln
BT
it it K it L it TFP Y K L ββ =− −
where  ˆ
K β  and  ˆ
L β  represent estimated capital and labor elasticity, respectively. We 
estimate (2) whilst taking account of the potential correlation between factor inputs and the 
error term. This may be important when contemporaneous unobserved productivity shocks 
affect the choice of factor inputs. The standard method to account for this is by 
implementing the procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) or extensions of the 
Olley-Pakes procedure such as the one proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). As R&D 
activities are considered to be an important determinant of TFP growth in Japan we allow 
for this feature in our empirical model. Accordingly, we use the method developed by 
Buettner (2003) that extends the Olley and Pakes procedure to account for the potential 
correlation between R&D activities and unobserved productivity shocks. See Appendix A 
for more details on Buettner’s (2003) method.   
 5  An advantage of the multilateral TFP index given by equation (1) is that we do not 
need to assume a specific functional form of the production function, while its drawback is 
that we have to assume perfect competition and constant returns to scale. In contrast, a 
major benefit of the regression-based TFP measure obtained from Buettner’s (2003) method 
is that we do not need to assume constant returns to scale. Its main shortcoming lies in 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function. Therefore, these two measures of TFP can 
be viewed as complements, and we will employ both measures to check the robustness of 
our results with respect to the measurement of TFP.   
2.2  Effect of offshoring on TFP growth 
Offshoring may affect TFP mainly because it allows firms to benefit from static and 
dynamic gains from specialization. Consider a developed-country firm which has multiple 
stages of production process and is more efficient in skill-intensive production stages. 
Offshoring labor-intensive or less skill-intensive stages allows the firm to make a more 
efficient use of production factors that remain in employment and thus increase the firms’ 
productivity. Moreover, the gain from specializing in skill-intensive stages of production 
process may be dynamic, rather than static. Young (1991), for example, suggests, that 
productivity in more advanced production stages may grow at a higher rate than 
productivity in less advanced stages, since the potential of improvements in the productivity 
through learning by doing are likely to be more pronounced in more sophisticated 
production activities than in more standardised activities which can be offshored. Thus, we 
would expect that specializing in skill-intensive production stages through offshoring 
generates higher growth in productivity due to larger learning-by-doing effects than in the 
case of no offshoring.   
 6  Based on this argument, we assume that the extent of offshoring has a positive effect 
on TFP growth of the firm. We assume the following estimable equation for firm-level TFP 
growth:   
  ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ln ln i t it O it D it R it i t i t AA O D R ρ βββδ α −−−− Δ= Δ + + + + + + ε , (3) 
where Ait is one of the two measures of TFP discussed in the previous subsection, and 
,1 ln ln ln it it i t A AA − Δ≡− . The lagged dependent variable,  ,1 ln it A − Δ , is included as a regressor 
to account for the persistence of TFP growth over time.
3 Oi,t-1 and Di,t-1 represent the extent 
of offshoring and domestic sourcing, respectively, for firm i in year t - 1. Ri,t-1 is the R&D 
intensity for firm i, or the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added. In contrast to Görg and 
Hanley (2005), Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2005), and Amiti and Wei (2006), we explicitly 
control for the role of the R&D activities in TFP growth. Failing to do so may lead to 
omitted variable bias, when the decision to offshore and expenditure on R&D are correlated. 
δi and αt are firm- and time-specific effects, respectively, and εit is the error term.   
  More specifically, the offshoring intensity, O, is represented by the ratio of the 
expenditure on subcontracting of products, parts and components to foreign providers to 
value added of the firm. We denote this as Offshoring that represents the intensity of 
offshoring in general, including international outsourcing and international insourcing. In 
addition, we employ a measure of the intensity of international insourcing, a particular type 
of offshoring, defined as the ratio of purchases from the firm’s own foreign subsidiaries to 
value added. This variable, denoted by International Insourcing, is used to examine the 
effect of offshoring to the firm’s own subsidiaries in particular, rather than offshoring in 
general. By including both measures simultaneously we can infer to what extent the 
organisational model of offshoring, intra-firm or arm’s length, matter. The intensity of 
                                                        
3 GMM estimation without the lagged TFP growth as a regressor and GMM estimation with the lagged TFP 
level lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that instruments and the error term are orthogonal according 
to the Hansen J statistic. 
 7domestic sourcing, D, is represented by the ratio of the expenditure on subcontracting of 
products, parts and components to domestic providers to value added and denoted by 
Domestic Sourcing. The expenditure on international and domestic subcontracting and 
purchases from firms’ own foreign subsidiaries are directly reported by each firm. Table 1 
summarizes the definition of the key variables used in the present analysis.     
2.3 Estimation  method 
An econometric concern that needs to be addressed when estimating equation (3) is the 
endogeneity of regressors. In other words, estimation will be biased if firms decide to 
engage in offshoring on the basis of any unobserved productivity differences across firms. 
The direction of the bias is not immediately clear. When there is a fixed cost of offshoring 
that induces a self-selection process so that only the most productive firms offshore, the 
coefficient on offshoring will be upward biased. If, on the contrary, low productivity firms 
engage in defensive offshore in order to boost their competitiveness, the coefficient on 
offshoring will be downward biased. The same applies to our domestic sourcing and R&D 
variables.  
  Therefore, we employ the system GMM estimation developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) to correct for the possible endogeneity of any of our right-hand side variables in 
equation (3) and to eliminate firm-specific fixed effects. We use as instruments the first and 
second lags of endogenous regressors for the first-differenced equation and their first 
first-differenced lags for the level equation. We employ one-step GMM, using robust 
standard errors.
4  
  Before closing this section, we should note several limitations of our empirical 
framework. First, we only allow the offshoring intensity (as well as the domestic sourcing 
and the R&D intensity) to shift the iso-product curve, and we do not allow for an effect of 
                                                        
4 We also include the full set of industry-year dummies (note that this does not mean industry dummies and 
year dummies) in equation (3).   
 8offshoring that leads to the rotation of the iso-product curve. In other words, we only focus 
on Hicks neutral productivity effects and disregard the role of offshoring as channel for 
skill-biased technological changes as, for example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) argue. The 
present empirical model may thus be considered as a short-run model in which factor shares 
are constant.
5 Second, our empirical specification only captures partial equilibrium effects 
and disregards general equilibrium effects. In the long-run, however, general equilibrium 
effects are also likely to affect productivity, if, for example, individual offshoring decisions 
at the firm level are concentrated in certain sectors so as to induce sector-wide technological 
change.
6 Finally, gains from offshoring discussed here refer exclusively to the increase in 
the productivity growth of the factors that remain in employment. It should be emphasized 
that although firms often engage in offshoring to reduce costs through lower input prices, 
the present methodology employing TFP based on real inputs and output does not capture 
the cost-saving motive of offshoring.   
3.    Data Description and Summary Statistics 
The data employed in this paper are drawn from Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey 
of Enterprise Activities), which is conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI). This dataset covers all firms with more than 50 employees and 30 
million yen of assets in manufacturing, mining and commerce industries. Participation in 
the survey for those firms is compulsory. The survey was first conducted in 1991, and then 
annually from 1994 onward. We restrict ourselves to manufacturing firms during the period 
                                                        
5 This characterization is convenient for the present case as we are interested in the benefits of offshoring to 
the firm rather than the distributional issues which have preoccupied the lion’s share of the existing literature. 
6 See Kohler (2004) and Hijzen (2006) for more details of such general equilibrium effects. 
 91994-2000, since for more recent years no information on domestic or international 
subcontracting is available.
7  
  Figure 1 provides time trends in the measures of offshoring and domestic sourcing. 
During the period 1994-1999, the average of offshoring intensity (Offshoring) rises from 
1.2% to 1.8% in terms of value added, whereas the international insourcing intensity 
(International Insourcing) rises from 3.4% to 5.3%. In contrast to the increasing trend in the 
offshoring and international insourcing intensity, the trend in the domestic sourcing 
intensity is negative.
8
  It is worth noting that International Insourcing in our dataset is greater on average 
than Offshoring. This may be surprising as in our definitions above international insourcing 
was represented as a subset of offshoring. The fact that this is not the case in practice 
reflects differences in the product coverage of both variables. International Insourcing 
includes all intermediate purchases from the firms’ foreign subsidiaries, whereas Offshoring 
includes only the value of subcontracted production activities to foreign providers. The 
former may therefore include the imports of raw material and capital goods which are not 
excluded from the latter.     
  Figure 2 represents the offshoring intensity across different industries. It shows 
significant differences across industries. According to the offshoring measure, the apparel 
and leather industries appear to be the most active offshoring industries in Japan. Both 
industries are relatively intensive users of unskilled labor and well-known examples of 
import offshoring industries. The presence of large foreign-home wage differentials are 
likely to play an important role in explaining the offshoring decisions in these two 
industries. These two are followed by the electrical machinery and electronics industry and 
                                                        
7 Data for 2000 are only used to construct the growth rate of TFP, whereas data for the period 1994-1999 
contain information on offshoring and domestic sourcing.   
8 However, given the short nature of our panel any inferences regarding the time trend should be taken with 
caution. 
 10the medical, precision and optical instruments industry, which on average are 
high-technology industries but also contain less skill-intensive production processes.   
  Figure 2 also shows that industries with large offshoring intensity tend to exhibit large 
international insourcing intensity as well. There are, however, some exceptions. Most 
notably, the coke and petroleum products industry shows an extremely large International 
Insourcing, while showing an Offshoring close to zero. This can be explained by the wider 
product coverage of our International Insourcing measure as compared to our Offshoring 
measure.  
  We present summary statistics for the regressand and regressors in panel A of Table 2, 
whereas panel B of the same table distinguishes between firms that offshore and that do not 
offshore. We are particularly interested in the relationship between offshoring and 
productivity growth. The descriptive statistics indicate that firms that engage in offshoring 
or international insourcing exhibit faster productivity growth and larger domestic sourcing 
and R&D intensity than other firms. In our formal econometric analysis we will now 
examine whether offshoring in fact leads to faster productivity growth, controlling for other 
possible factors and unobserved productivity shocks or whether offshoring firms merely do 
so because they experience higher productivity growth.   
4.  Results 
4.1 Baseline  results 
Table 3 presents the baseline results on the impact of offshoring on TFP growth. The results 
in Table 3A are based on estimations using the multilateral index of TFP, whereas results in 
Table 3B are based on estimations using Buettner’s (2003) regression-based measure of TFP. 
 11Since the results are virtually identical for both measures of TFP, we will concentrate on the 
results based on the multilateral TFP index.
9  
  Although our benchmark estimation method is the system GMM, as we previously 
explained, we first look at the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) reported in columns 
1-3 of Table 3A for reference. The results in columns 1 and 2 show that offshoring and 
international insourcing have a positive and significant effect on TFP growth when included 
separately, but that the effect of offshoring becomes insignificant when the two variables are 
included together as regressors (column 3). The extent of domestic sourcing and R&D 
activities shows a significant and positive effect on TFP growth in all of the three 
specifications. However, these results may be biased when offshoring decisions are taken on 
the basis of unobserved productivity differences between firms captured by the error term.   
  In order to take account of the possible endogeneity problem associated with the OLS 
regressions, we re-estimate our model employing the system GMM and report the results in 
columns 4-6 of Table 3A. In all specifications, the Hansen J statistic and the Arrellano-Bond 
statistic presented in the last two rows suggest that the instruments are orthogonal to the 
error term and that there is no serial correlation in the error term. The system GMM 
estimations point at statistically significant effects of offshoring and international insourcing 
on total factor productivity in all specifications,. Moreover, these effects are larger than the 
results from the OLS estimations suggesting that the OLS results are downward biased due 
a positive contemporaneous correlation between offshoring and unobserved productivity 
shocks and accordingly a negative correlation between offshoring and first-differenced 
productivity shocks (ε in equation [3]).
10  
  More specifically, the GMM results suggest that a 1-percentage point increase in the 
offshoring intensity raises TFP growth by 0.17 percentage points. Using the mean of the 
                                                        
9 The correlation coefficient of the two measures of TFP growth is 0.99.   
10 Amiti and Wei (2006) also observe that the effect of offshoring increases once they control for the 
correlation between offshoring and unobserved productivity shocks. 
 12offshoring intensity in Table 2, this result suggests that for the average offshoring firm, 
which has a mean offshoring intensity of 0.104, average annual TFP growth is 
1.8-percentage points higher
11 than had it not engaged in offshoring, everything else equal. 
Similarly, firms that engage in international insourcing experience, on average, a 1.5 
percentage increase in TFP growth than firms that do not engage in international insourcing. 
Thus, we conclude that the effect of offshoring and international insourcing on TFP growth 
is quantitatively large and positive.   
  When we use both of the offshoring intensity and the international insourcing intensity 
as regressors, we find that both have a positive and significant effect (column 6 of Table 
3A). The positive effect of the offshoring intensity even after controlling for the 
international insourcing intensity implies that international outsourcing, or contracting out 
of production activities to foreign firms that are not the firm’s own foreign subsidiaries, also 
has a positive impact on TFP growth. In other words, offshoring production activities 
improves firms’ TFP growth regardless of the organisational mode, intra-firm or arm’s 
length, that is adopted.   
  In addition to the offshoring and international insourcing intensity, the domestic 
sourcing intensity has a positive and significant impact on TFP growth in all specifications. 
Since Offshoring and Domestic Sourcing represent the ratio to value added of purchases of 
intermediate inputs from foreign and domestic suppliers we can directly compare the effect 
of offshoring and domestic sourcing by looking at the coefficients of the two variables. 
Column 6 of Table 3A reports that the coefficient of Offshoring is 0.168 whereas the 
coefficient of Domestic Sourcing is 0.040. These results indicate that contracting out a 
particular production process to foreign suppliers leads to a fourfold improvement in TFP 
                                                        
11 0.104 * 0.17 = 0.01768. 
 13growth compared to the case when contracting out the same production process to domestic 
suppliers.
12
4.2  Differences in the size of the effect of offshoring across firms 
So far, we have estimated the effect of offshoring on TFP growth, ignoring the possible 
variation in its size across firms. However, the size of the effect of offshoring may be 
expected to differ for a number of reasons. First, the offshoring effect may vary across 
industries. Firms in high-technology industries that engage in offshoring may be able to 
specialize in highly sophisticated production stages that involve substantial 
learning-by-doing effects. However, for offshoring firms in low-technology industries the 
potential of such learning effects may be more limited since their specialized production 
stages are not as sophisticated as in high-technology industries. If this is the case, we would 
expect to observe a larger offshoring effect on TFP growth in high-technology industries 
than in low-technology industries.     
  Second, Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2005) suggest that the benefits from offshoring may 
vary in the level of the search costs of selecting foreign suppliers. Görg, Hanley and Strobl 
(2005) therefore split the sample between multinationals and domestic firms, and exporters 
and non-exporters, based on the conjecture that experience in foreign markets may lower 
the search costs for foreign suppliers. The results by Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2005) 
confirm their predictions.   
  Third, the benefits from offshoring may depend on a firms’ current productivity level. 
For firms that have already achieved a high productivity level, the benefits from offshoring 
may be smaller since the opportunity for further productivity growth is likely to be small.   
                                                        
12 However, since offshoring firms are likely to incur larger initial search costs to select providers than firms 
that source domestically, this evidence does not necessarily suggest a larger net benefit from offshoring than 
that from domestic sourcing. However, this evidence does suggest that the net benefit from offshoring may be 
larger than that from domestic sourcing for firms with low search costs of offshoring. 
 14  To see whether the benefits from offshoring differ across different types of firm, we 
split the sample to two sub-samples in the following three ways and report the mean of key 
variables for those subsamples in Table 4: firms in high- and low-technology industries
13; 
multinational and local firms; and exporting and non-exporting firms. In Table 4, we do not 
observe any major differences in terms of their offshoring or international insourcing 
intensity between high- and low-tech industries, or between exporters and non-exporters. 
However, we do observe, perhaps not surprisingly, that multinationals are more important 
offshorers than purely domestic firms. Multinationals, after all, have access to an 
international production work which may be destined, or at the very least, may be expected 
to facilitate offshoring arrangements.   
  To formally examine how the size of the effect of offshoring on productivity depends 
on industry- and firm-characteristics, we augment equation (3) with an interaction term 
between the offshoring measure and a dummy variable for certain industry- and 
firm-characteristics. First, we use a dummy variable which is one for firms in 
high-technology industries and zero otherwise. The GMM results reported in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 5 indicate that the effect of either interaction term between the dummy variable 
and Offshoring or International Insourcing is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.
14 These results are inconsistent with the conjecture put forward above. The effect of 
offshoring in low-technology industries is as large as the effect of offshoring in 
high-technology industries. This suggests that learning effects do not depend on the level of 
technological sophistication of one’s industry.     
  Second, we estimate whether the effect of offshoring differs between multinational 
and domestic firms and between exporting and non-exporting firms using interaction 
                                                        
13 High-technology industries are defined as the following 5 industries: chemicals, machinery and equipment, 
electrical machinery and electronics, transportation equipment, and precision instruments. Low-technology 
industries are all other industries.   
14 The result in column 1 of Table 6 indicates that the effect of Offshoring is insignificant. This result is 
probably generated by multicollinearity between Offshoring and the interaction term between Offshoring and 
the dummy variable for high-tech industries. The correlation coefficient of the two variables is 0.77.     
 15dummies for multinational firms and for exporting firms. The GMM results presented in 
columns 3-6 of Table 5 show that the coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant. 
At first sight, these results seem to inconsistent with the hypothesis and the empirical results 
presented by Görg et al. (2005) that multinationals and exporters benefit more from 
offshoring than other firms. However, we should note that Görg et al. (2005) find a larger 
effect of offshoring on the level of productivity for multinationals and exporters, while here 
we focus on the effect of offshoring on productivity growth. Thus, the disparity between the 
results of the present study and those by Görg et al. (2005) suggests that the advantage of 
multinationals and exporters due to lower search costs of selecting suitable foreign suppliers 
is static, rather than dynamic. In other words, lower search costs for multinationals and 
exporters benefit those firms only one time when they start offshoring, but the benefit 
vanishes in later years.   
    Finally, in order to examine how the firm’s current productivity level affects the 
impact of offshoring, we interact the offshoring variables with the lagged TFP level and 
include the resulting interaction term as an additional regressor. The GMM results reported 
in columns 7-8 of Table 5 indicate that including the interaction terms does not greatly 
affect the estimates for the offshoring and international insourcing intensity. However, we 
find that the interaction term has a negative and significant effect in the two specifications. 
This evidence indicates that firms with a lower level of TFP benefit more from offshoring 
than firms with a higher TFP level probably due to latecomers’ advantage, being consistent 
with our presumption above.
15 Thus, offshoring appears to provide an effective strategy for 
less productive firms to catch up with their competitors.       
                                                        
15 The interaction term between the lagged TFP level and the domestic sourcing intensity has also a negative 
and significant effect, indicating that latecomers’ advantage can be applied to domestic sourcing.   
 165.  Concluding  Remarks 
In the present paper, we explore the impact of offshoring on firm productivity growth, using 
firm-level data for the Japanese manufacturing industries during the period 1994-2000. We 
find that offshoring has generally a positive effect on productivity growth. This effect is 
robust to controlling for the possible endogeneity of offshoring with respect to unobserved 
productivity shocks. We further find that the size of the effect of offshoring does not vary 
between firms in high- and low-technology industries, between multinationals and domestic 
firms, or between exporting and non-exporting firms. This evidence suggests that 
offshoring has a positive impact on productivity growth for a wide range of firms. Finally, 
the impact of offshoring is found to depend negatively on the productivity level of the firm, 
indicating that offshoring provides an effective channel to restore competitiveness for less 
productive  firms.   
  Although our findings shed some light on the offshoring literature, we should note 
that our results need to be interpreted with care. First, the cost-saving effect cannot be 
examined in the framework of our analysis using TFP based on real output and inputs. 
Second, our analysis is based on a production function and thus disregards 
general-equilibrium effects. Therefore, the results of the present paper should be interpreted 
at the level of the individual firm and cannot be straightforwardly be used to make 
inferences about the total effect of offshoring on the Japanese economy.     
 17Appendix A: Buettner's (2003) Method for Productivity Measurement 
Buettner (2003) incorporates R&D investment into the method of Olley and Pakes (1996) 
for productivity measurement and presents several alternative methods. In what follows, we 
explain a particular type of those methods that assumes no exit of firms (type “k” in his 
notation), which is adopted in this paper.   
  We begin with the following Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t: 
  0 β ββ ω =+ + ++ it K it L it it it yk l η , (A1) 
where  ln x X ≡  for any variable X, Yit, Kit, and Lit are value added, capital stocks, and 
labor of firm i at time t, respectively. ωit represents the productivity level, and ηit a 
productivity shock. It is assumed that the distribution of ωit is governed by a single 
parameter, ψit. At the beginning of time t + 1, firm i observes kit and ωit and chooses ki,t+1 
and  ψi,t+1. This choice requires R&D expenditure of  ,1 ,1 (, ) ψ ω ++ = it it i t REX REX , where 
/0 ψ ∂∂ > REX  and  /0 ω ∂ ∂< REX . In other words, the distribution of the productivity in the 
next period is a function of the current productivity level and the current R&D 
investment.
16
  Given these assumptions, firm i's optimal choice of investment at time t, Iit, depends 
on the current productivity level ωit and the current capital stock kit:  (,) ω = it t it it ii k . We 
invert this equation to obtain ωit as a function of iit and kit. Then, the production function 
(A1) can be rewritten as 
  (, ) β φη =+ + it L it it it it it yli k  
                                                        
16 In the Olley-Pakes method, ψi,t+1 equals ωit and does not depend on R&D investment. 
 18where  0 φ ββ ω =+ + it K it it k . Semi-parametric estimation of this equation by OLS assuming 
that  it φ  is a polynomial series expansion of the arguments leads to a consistent estimation 
of βL.  
 To  estimate  βK in the second stage, we first rearrange equation (A1) as   
  0 β ββ ωη −= + + + it L it K it it it yl k .     (A2) 
We assume a Markov process in ω:  [] ω ωψ ξ η = ++ it it it it it E , where ξit is productivity 
innovation and unrelated with kit. Thus, equation (A2) can be rewritten as 
  0 [] β ββ ω ψ ξη −= + + + + it L it K it it it it it yl k E . (A3) 
The optimal choice of the distribution parameter ψi,t+1 can be written as a function of ωit 
and ki,t+1:  
  ,1 ,1 (, ) ψ ψω ++ = it i t it k . (A4) 
Combining equations (A3) and (A4), we obtain 
  0, 1 (( ,) ) it L it K it it i t it it it yl k g k β ββ ψ ω ξη − −= + + + + . (A5) 
Since we have  ,1 ,1 0 ,1 it it K it k ω φβ β −− − = −− , we further rewrite the first three terms of the 
right-hand side of equation (A5) as a nonlinear function of  ,1 ,1 it K it k φ β − − −  and  :  it k
  ,1 ,1 (, ) it L it i t K i t it it it yl f k k β φβ ξ −− −= − + + η . (A5) 
We estimate equation (A5) by nonlinear least squares, approximating function f by a 
polynomial series expansion, to obtain a consistent estimate of βK.  
  Given the consistent estimates of βK and βL, we measure the log of the TFP level of 
firm i at time t as  β β − − it L it K it ylk . 
 19Appendix B: Construction of Variables 
This appendix provides supplementary information on the construction of our dataset.
17 To 
construct data employed in the present analysis, we use firm-level data from Kigyo Katsudo 
Kihon Chosa (KKKC, Basic Survey of Enterprise Activities) and industry-level data from 
the Japan Industry Productivity (JIP) Database 2006. The JIP Database 2006 is constructed 
by the Firm- and Industry-Level Productivity Research Group organized in the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) of Japan and headed by Kyoji Fukao and 
Tsutomu Miyagawa. The JIP Database 2006 includes various data during the period 
1970-2002 at the 3-digit industry level, including price deflators of output, intermediate 
inputs, and capital goods and input-output matrices. The complete database is available at 
the web site of RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp).  
  Real sales is defined as nominal total sales reported in KKKC deflated by the output 
deflator at the 3-digit level taken from the JIP Database. The nominal value of intermediate 
inputs is defined as the sum of costs of goods sold and general and administrative expense 
minus labor costs and the value of depreciation. The nominal value of intermediate inputs is 
deflated by the intermediate-goods deflator also taken from the JIP Database to obtain the 
real value of intermediate inputs. Real value added is defined as real sales less the real 
value of intermediate inputs.   
  Firms' real capital stock represents the real value of the stock of tangible fixed assets 
excluding land, since the book value of land may not reflect the true value of the land, in 
particular if the land was purchased long time ago. However, the value of land owned by 
each firm is available only in the KKKC data for 1995 and 1996, although information on 
                                                        
17 When importing raw datasets, we heavily relied on Stata programs written by Toshiyuki Matsuura for 
Matsuura (2004). 
 
 20the total value of tangible fixed assets including land is available for all years. Therefore, 
we estimate the nominal value of tangible fixed assets excluding land of firm i in industry j 
in year t, NomKijt, by multiplying the firm's total tangible assets including land by one 
minus industry j's average share of the land value in the total tangible fixed assets in 1995 
and 1996. Then, we derive the real capital stock of firm i in industry j in year t, Kijt, from 
NomKijt, using the industry total of nominal tangible fixed assets excluding land, 
∈ =∑ jt ij NomK NomKi j t , and the estimated real value of the corresponding variable, Kjt, 
taken from the JIP Database:  . K / =× ijt ijt jt jt KN o m KK N o m K jt, is obtained by the perpetual 
inventory method, using industry-level data on fixed capital formation during the period 
1975-2000 and industry-level data on fixed assets in 1975.   
  Labor inputs are measured in the man-hour base. Since information on working hours 
for each firm is not available in KKKC, we use the industry average of working hours taken 
from the JIP Database. R&D expenditure of each parent firm is deflated by the industry 
price deflator of intermediate inputs.   
  We limit our sample to firms whose TFP level, R&D expenditure, the measure of 
offshoring, and the measure of domestic sourcing are available for at least five consecutive 
years during the seven-year period 1994-2000. Then, to alleviate biases due to outliners, we 
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International Insourcing (left scale)
Domestic Sourcing (right scale)
 
Notes: This figure presents the average of the key variables in our 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































International Insourcing (left scale)
Domestic Sourcing (right scale)
 
(0.501) 
Notes: This figure presents the average of the key variables in our 
sample by industry. Numbers in parentheses on the horizontal axis 
indicate 2-digit industry classifications. See Table 1 for the definition 




 27 28Table 1. List of Key Variables 
Variable name  Definition 
Offshoring 
Ratio of the value of subcontracting to foreign providers 
to value added 
International Insourcing 
Ratio of purchases from the firm’s own foreign 
subsidiaries to value added 
Domestic Sourcing 
Ratio of the value of subcontracting to domestic 
providers  
to value added 
R&D  Ratio of R&D expenditure to value added 
 29Table 2. Summary Statistics 






IN 0.014 0.325  -4.705 3.034 
ΔlnTFP
BT 0.011 0.324  -4.705 3.028 
Offshoring  0.017 0.070 0.000 0.844 
International 
Insourcing 
0.049 0.235 0.000  11.974 
Domestic 
Sourcing 
0.473 0.665 0.000 5.218 
R&D  0.075 0.093 0.000 0.631 
 
B: Offshoring versus Non-Offshoring Firms   
Subsamples 
Offshoring 
 >  0 
Offshoring 
 =  0 
 Internationa
l Insourcing
 >  0 
Internationa
l Insourcing 
 =  0 
No. of 
observations 
2052 10512  3590  8974 
ΔlnTFP
IN 0.021 0.013  0.024 0.010 
ΔlnTFP
BT 0.018 0.011  0.022 0.007 
Offshoring  0.104 0.000  0.033 0.011 
International 
Insourcing 
0.068 0.045  0.171 0.000 
Domestic 
Sourcing 
0.937 0.382  0.552 0.441 
R&D  0.089 0.072  0.094 0.067 
 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables used. 
 30 
 31Table 3. Baseline Results 
A: Using the multilateral TFP index (TFP
IN) 
 Dependent  variable:  ΔlnTFP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation 
method 
OLS OLS OLS GMM  GMM  GMM 
0.070   0.050  0.173   0.168 
Offshoring  
(0.032)*   (0.032)  (0.090)
+  (0.091)+
 0.053  0.051   0.090  0.087 
International 










0.008 0.009 0.008 0.041 0.042 0.040 
Domestic 




0.156 0.154 0.154 0.158 0.156 0.165 









-0.226 -0.224 -0.224 -0.135 -0.134 -0.133 












No. of obs.  12564  12564  12564  12564  12564  12564 
R
2 0.47 0.48 0.48       
Hansen  J 
statistic 
    0.98  1.00  1.00 
Arrellano-Bond 
statistic 
    0.25  0.24  0.27 
 
 
 32B: Using Buettner’s (2003) TFP measure (TFP
BT) 
 Dependent  variable:  ΔlnTFP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation 
method 
OLS OLS OLS GMM  GMM  GMM 
0.073   0.054  0.173   0.168 
Offshoring  
(0.032)*   (0.032)+ (0.089)
+  (0.090)+
 0.052  0.051   0.087  0.084 
International 










0.009 0.010 0.009 0.041 0.042 0.040 
Domestic 









0.146 0.145 0.144 0.140 0.137 0.146 






(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
-0.222 -0.220 -0.220 -0.134 -0.133 -0.132 












No.  of  obs.  12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 
R
2 0.48 0.48 0.48       
Hansen  J 
statistic 
    1.00  1.00  1.00 
Arrellano-Bond 
statistic 
    0.22  0.21  0.24 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables used. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
+, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. All specifications include industry-year dummies. P values are 
reported for Hansen J statistics and the Arellano-Bond statistics for second-order 
serial  correlation.   



















IN 0.021 0.003  0.020 0.010    0.016 0.008 
ΔlnTFP
BT 0.017 0.001  0.018 0.006    0.013 0.006 
Offshoring  0.018 0.016  0.025 0.011    0.017 0.016 
International 
Insourcing 





0.509 0.415  0.559 0.405 
 
0.485 0.425 
R&D  0.095 0.044  0.094 0.060    0.082 0.047 
Notes: See Table 1 for the description of the variables used. High-technology industries are defined as the 
following five industries: chemicals, machinery and equipment, electrical machinery and electronics, 
transportation equipment, and precision instruments. Low-technology industries are all other industries. 
Multinational firms are defined as firms with any positive balance in foreign investment.     
 34Table 5. Effect of Interaction Terms between Offshoring Measures   
and Variables Representing Industry- and Firm-Characteristics 
 Dependent  variable:    ΔlnTFP
IN
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation method  GMM  GMM  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
X (interacted variable) 






Dummy for   
exporting firms 
lagged lnTFP 









0.067   -0.177   0.004   -0.316  
Offshoring * X 




 0.085   0.087   0.088   0.114 
International 












 0.186   0.041   0.149   0.037  International 
Insourcing * X   (0.125)   (0.115)   (0.099)   (0.027) 
0.040 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.033 0.033 
















       -0.128  -0.132 
Domestic Sourcing * X 


















-0.135 -0.134 -0.135 -0.134 -0.135 -0.134 -0.129 -0.099 
















No.  of  observations  12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 
 35Hansen J  statistic  0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 
Arrellano-Bond  statistic  0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.09 0.14 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables used. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
+, *, and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All specifications include the 
interacted variable X and industry-year dummies. P values are reported for Hansen J statistics and the 
Arellano-Bond statistics for second-order serial correlation.     
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